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DRAFTING OF GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION ARTICLES
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
CHARLES A. REYNARD*
When the parties to collective bargaining negotiations formulate
the provisions of their contract relating to grievances and arbitration,
they are establishing the basic system of private administrative law
that will govern the plant community for the period of the agreement.
This is obviously a task that involves more than mere words and
phrases. The maturity of their relationship, their respective under-
standings of the place of collective bargaining in our industrial society,
the size and nature of the plant, and innumerable other considerations
will substantially influence the choice of language and procedures
adopted in the framing of these provisions. Because of the interaction
of these various considerations-many of them intangible-it is, of
course, impossible to prescribe a single procedure or set of procedures
which will be ideally suited to fit the needs of all collective bargaining
situations. Recognizing, therefore, that it is impossible and even
undesirable to suggest stereotyped or "model" contract provisions to
cover the situation, it is the writer's purpose to suggest some of the
common problems encountered in the course of the drafting of the
grievance and arbitration provisions of collective bargaining agree-
ments, to mention some of the factors involved in the consideration
of these problems and to indicate and evaluate some of the more
common types of provisions currently employed in typical contracts.
For purposes of analysis, and without becoming unduly academic,
it may be said that the drafting problems arise in different forms at
three stages of the collective bargaining process. In chronological
order, these three problems are: (1) the definition to be accorded
the term "grievance" which will identify the nature and types of
disputes to be dealt with by the procedures established, (2) the
grievance procedure itself, which determines and describes the meth-
ods by which the parties themselves will handle these disputes in an
effort to effect satisfactory settlements without the intervention of
outsiders, and (3) the arbitration provision, fixing and describing
the method and procedures by which disputes, remaining unsettled
after exhaustion of the grievance procedure, will be referred to arbi-
tration for final and binding decision. These three different, but re-
lated, problems will be separately discussed in order.
I. THE DEFINITION OF GRIEVANCES.
Although some collective bargaining agreements may still be found
which provide that "all grievances" shall be handled through the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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grievance procedures of the contract, it must be recognized that the
term thus broadly used is ambiguous. A "grievance," Webster tells us,
is "A cause of uneasiness and complaint; a wrong; an injury." It is
conceivable, therefore, that under a contract which fails to limit the
term, all manner of complaints might be filed and efforts made to have
them settled through the grievance procedure. These complaints
might range from efforts on the part of the union to secure concessions
it had been unable to obtain at the bargaining table to individual em-
ployee protests concerning the color used to paint the company's
trucks. When complaints of these kinds are filed, the employer op-
poses the processing of the grievances on the ground that those of the
first type were conclusively settled by the contract, and those in the
second category fall within the broad realm of management preroga-
tive. From all of this it becomes obvious that the term "grievance"
must be more limited or circumscribed, and the problem of definition
arises.
In seeking to arrive at a workable definition, the parties are con-
cerned with an issue that involves more than a simple matter of
terminology. The latitude accorded the meaning of the term "griev-
ance" will, of course, determine the volume of business that will be
transacted under the grievance procedure. More importantly, it will
substantially influence the relationship of the parties since it will
reflect their attitudes and philosophies concerning the extent to which
matters of mutual importance should be openly discussed during the
term of their agreement.
Traditionally, it has been the management view that "During the
life of the contract the union's concern is to see that management, in
its everyday operation of the plant, does not violate the contractual
policy. The union's function can properly be considered to be that of
'watch dog,' in contrast to the management's function, which is to
carry the responsibility as the 'acting' party for efficient operations.
... The purpose of the grievance procedure is simply to provide a
method whereby the union can obtain compliance with the contract
itself."' In keeping with this thesis, management representatives have
tended to insist that the term "grievance" be limited to complaints
involving the interpretation or application of the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.
Union spokesmen, on the other hand, have consistently opposed
this position saying that "All grievances, whether real or fancied,
reflect discontent and affect production and should be settled (through
the grievance machinery, made applicable to them by broadly defining
the term 'grievances'). Grievances which are banned find expression
1. Fairweather and Shaw, Minimizing Disputes in Labor Contract Negotia-
tions, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 297, 315-16 (1947).
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in reduced morale, or have the curious trait of assuming the guise of
admissible grievances . . . The excluded and therefore unsettled
grievance has the annoying characteristic of making itself known
through a drop in efficiency, absenteeism, shutdown, controlled pro-
duction, quit or turnover."2 Pursuant to this thesis, union representa-
tives have consistently sought to have the term "grievance" defined
as broadly as possible, and have resisted management efforts to restrict
it solely to disputes arising over interpretation of contractual provi-
sions.
It should be noted that entirely independently of the contractual
definition of the term "grievances," the duty to meet and negotiate
disputes arising under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
is imposed by the language of section 8 (d) of the Labor Management
Relations Act 3 which reads in part as follows:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to . . . the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder .... (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, the National Labor Relations Board has held that an em-
ployer, when so requested, has the duty, during the term of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, to meet and bargain with representatives
of his union on matters appropriate for collective bargaining despite'
the fact that the contract contains no provisions respecting the sub-
ject.
4
Perhaps as a consequence of these legal developments, but more
likely as a result of experience gained in the course of living with
their grievance procedures, which has engendered a growing feeling
of mutual trust and confidence, the parties have tended to compromise
their extreme views as illustrated by the quotations set forth above
from articles which appeared as recently as ten years ago. In the
course of the writer's experience as an ad hoc arbitrator of labor-
management grievances, he has observed a growing tendency in the
course of collective bargaining for the parties' representatives to
broaden the definition of "grievances," in the direction of embracing
all disputes which arise during the period covered by the contract.
This is not to say that management has subscribed completely to the
union thesis previously quoted, but it does seem to bespeak an en-
dorsement of the view therein advanced that some outlet for dis-
gruntlement should be afforded in the fulfillment of the employer's
2. Katz, Minimizing Disputes Through the Adjustment of Grievances, 12
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 249, 259 (1947).
3. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 158(d) (1956).
4. Jacobs MAfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforcement granted, 196 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1952).
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own enlightened self-interest. Management is still concerned over
the prospect that complaints involving matters which it regards to
be plainly within that vaguely defined, but nonetheless real, area of
management prerogative, if allowed to be aired in the grievance pro-
cedures, may ultimately be referred to an arbitrator for final and bind-
ing decision. Employer representatives are understandably perturbed
over the prospect that some third party stranger, unfamiliar with their
problems, will, unless restrained, impose conditions upon the manage-
ment which are not only unacceptable, but which, by hypothesis, were
not even the subject matter of collective bargaining at the time the
contract was adopted.
To protect against this hazard, and at the same time to open the
gates of the grievance machinery to all complaints, employer repre-
sentatives have insisted that the contractual definition of the term
"grievances" be drawn to provide for two types or classes of "griev-
ances." The one type, which may be designated the "first-class griev-
ance," is, by definition, somewhat more narrow than the other. It may
be restricted solely to disputes which arise over the interpretation or
application of the terms of the agreement, or it may be expanded to
cover other, specific cases. In any event, it is limited in scope, but
the contract clearly provides that it shall receive the "red carpet"
treatment; that is to say, it may be processed through the regular
grievance machinery, and, if it remains unsettled at that point, re-
ferred to arbitration for final and binding decision. The other type
or the "second-class" grievance embraces all other complaints that
arise during the period covered by the contract. As to these, the con-
tract provides that while the grievance procedure shall be available
and used in attempts to solve them, if they remain unsettled at the
conclusion of grievance negotiations, arbitration shall not be invoked
in an effort at final settlement.
This compromise impresses the writer as a most encouraging devel-
opment. That it is only a compromise is clearly demonstrated by the
fact that neither of the traditional aims of the parties has been
achieved. Management has obviously yielded and withdrawn from
the position that the grievance machinery be restricted solely to those
disputes involving interpretation or application of the provisions of
the agreement. At the same time, the unions have yielded in their
insistence that the contract make provision for the final settlement of
all disputes which arise between the parties during the life of the
agreement. This represents but a development in the process of col-
lective bargaining. It has resulted from practical experience which
has instilled mutual faith and confidence in the minds of representa-
tives of both parties. It is but one facet of the total picture of labor-
management relations which illustrates the growing maturity of the
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institution of collective bargaining. There are few, if any, areas of
the field of collective bargaining that are more important in the
development of good labor-management relations than this one. The
grievance definition compromise indicates acceptance of the fact that
their mutual self interest requires a realistic treatment of the problem.
To the extent that each accepts its responsibilities under the compro-
mise and conducts negotiations in good faith, it may be expected that
further developments will be forthcoming.
II. THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE.
Once the parties have decided the type of disputes which will be
referred to the grievance procedure, it becomes necessary to spell out
the method by which they will seek to adjust these complaints by
negotiations between themselves without the intervention of outsiders.
Traditionally, this has been done by creating a multi-step procedure
pursuant to which successively higher echelons of management and
union representatives participate in the discussions looking toward
settlement. The number of steps or discussion-levels will vary, de-
pending upon the size and nature of the plant or plants involved and
the geographic situation presented. In a typical three-step grievance
procedure the contract will provide for a first step meeting between
the aggrieved employee (usually accompanied by his steward) and
the foreman, and, in the event of an unsatisfactory settlement, a second
step meeting between the union's grievance committee and the plant
or divisional superintendent with a third step meeting between top
union representatives and top management personnel. The represen-
tation on either side may vary with individual contracts, and it is
frequently provided that grievances must be filed within a desig-
nated time after they occur. Similar time periods are prescribed for
management to furnish answers to the union's complaints with a
further limitation of time upon the union to seek to have the grievance
processed at the next step. These variations upon representation, the
time limits imposed, and other incidents of the typical grievance pro-
cedure are well known to persons familiar with the problem and be-
cause of the wide variations in individual cases calling for specialized
handling of the issue, no attempt will be made here to treat all of the
manifestations of the problem. They are adequately dealt with else-
where.
5
There is one aspect of the grievance procedure which, in the judg-
ment of the writer, merits special mention here. Many observers
5. See ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 62-88 (1952); LAPP, LABOR ARBs-
TRATION 33-40 (1942); UPDEGRAFF AND McCoy, ARBITRATIoN or LABOR DISPUTES
52-54 (1946); Weiss and Hussey, Grievance Procedure Under Collective Bar-
gaining, 63 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 175 (1946).
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have heretofore pointed out that sound, stable labor relations will be
most effectively promoted if the representatives of each of the parties
approach grievance negotiations with the attitude that they have a
problem of mutual concern that must be solved, rather than a case to
win. It has come to the writer's attention that there is an increasing
tendency to utilize a device in the formulation of the grievance pro-
cedure which significantly encourages such an approach. This device
is found in the use of informality at the first step of the procedure.
Informality is injected by omitting any requirement that the grievance
be reduced to writing. A formal written grievance is, of course, de-
sirable, and even necessary where the complaint proceeds beyond the
first step. Some permanent statement of the dispute must be made for
the sake of the record to inform those representatives who will par-
ticipate in the negotiations at the higher levels. Furthermore, there is
always the possibility that in the course of complying with a require-
ment that the grievance be in writing, and seeking to state it in its
simplest terms, the parties will discover that they have far less to
quarrel about than they at first anticipated-or possibly nothing at all.
At the same time, however, there is an element of finality or irre-
trievability about a formal written grievance. The institution of
saving face is not restricted to the orientals; it has its American
counterpart in the industrial scene. If a worker or his foreman is
required to "go on record" from the very first incident in the course of
the grievance procedure, less opportunity is afforded for him to "back
down" when subsequent investigation or disclosures by the other side
show that he may have acted upon the basis of faulty information or
a mistaken understanding of contractual obligation, than is the case
where the contract calls for an informal meeting to discuss the matter.
There is a natural, human tendency to stand behind that which one
has documented and signed. Conversely, where the contract stipulates
that the first step of the grievance procedure shall consist of an in-
formal meeting of the parties without requiring them to commit them-
selves to documentation, there is a far greater likelihood that when
erroneous assumptions of fact or contract interpretation are disclosed
in the give and take of such discussions, the errant party will more
readily concede his error and recant from his position.
Based upon a recognition of this human characteristic (or perhaps
upon the basis of experience), parties to collective bargaining agree-
ments are increasingly providing that the first step of their grievance
machinery shall consist of an informal meeting between the parties'
representatives. Only if and when this first step results in an unsatis-
factory settlement, with the result that the grievance will be carried
further, is the requirement imposed that the complaint be reduced to
writing. It is impossible, of course, to estimate the extent to which
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the informality of the procedure at this point results in the satisfactory
settlement of disputes (a very substantial portion of all grievances
are settled at the first step, whether they are required to be in writing
or not). However, it is the writer's view, based upon discussions
with both management and labor representatives using the informal
technique, that it is a factor which contributes substantially to the
improvement of the grievance procedure and does, in fact, result in
the solution of a greater number of disputes.
III. THE ARBITRATION ARTICLE.
Just as the grievance procedure affords an orderly method for nego-
tiating the settlement of grievances which arise during the period
covered by the agreement, the arbitration provision is inserted for the
purpose of securing final and binding adjustment of those disputes
which remain unsettled after the grievance procedure has been ex-
hausted. Since arbitration is to be invoked only if the parties them-
selves have been unable to reach agreement, and their failure to do so
might reasonably be expected to have strained amicable relations, it
would appear logical to expect that they would spell out the procedure
for the selection of the arbitrator and the handling of the case in
considerable detail. Unfortunately, however, this has not always been
the case. Numerous contracts were to be found a few short years ago
which simply declared that unresolved grievances should be "referred
to arbitration."
More recently, however, and perhaps as a result of unsatisfactory
experience with such vaguely worded clauses, the parties have tended
to be far more particular in their contractual explication of the arbi-
tration process. In the course of a study of more than fourteen hundred
contracts in effect in 1952 the Bureau of Labor Statistics discovered
that eighty-nine percent of these agreements contained provisions
relating to the arbitration of grievances.6 Apparently all of these
contracts spelled out the method by which the arbitrator would be
selected, although thirty percent of them "failed to provide a predeter-
mined means of breaking a deadlock over the selection of an arbitra-
tor."17 Eighty-two percent of the contracts studied fixed the scope of
the arbitrator's jurisdiction, and three-fourths of them dealt with
the compensation of the arbitrator and made provision for allocating
the cost of the proceeding between the parties.
Various methods are commonly used for selecting the arbitrator.
In a growing number of cases involving larger industries, it has be-
come the practice to provide for a permanent arbitrator who is either
6. Moore and Nix, Arbitration Provisions in Collective Agreements, 1952,
76 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 261 (1953).
7. Id. at 263.
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named in the instrument itself or pursuant to a method of selection
provided for in the agreement. More frequently, it is provided that
arbitration will be on an ad hoc basis, pursuant to which the parties
will request the American Arbitration Association, the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service or some other governmental
agency to appoint the arbitrator or to submit a list of the names of
qualified arbitrators from which the parties will make their own selec-
tion. In the latter case, the contract usually provides for a panel of
odd numbered names with the right of each party to alternately strike
names until the name of a single person remains on the list who then
is selected to serve.
One of the most significant facts disclosed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics study and confirmed by the writer's experience as an arbi-
trator is the persistence of the tripartite board in ad hoc labor arbitra-
tion. Forty-six percent of the contracts examined by the Bureau
provided for ad hoc arbitration by tripartite boards consisting of repre-
sentatives of management and the union appointed by the respective
parties, together with a third or impartial member selected pursuant
to one of the methods mentioned above. These agreements, while
constituting forty-six percent of the contracts studied, represented
only twenty-six percent of the employees covered by all of the agree-
ments. Seventeen percent of the agreements, representing thirty-seven
percent of the employees covered, provided for permanent arbitration
machinery. Thirty percent of the contracts, applying to thirty-two
percent of the employees covered, provided for ad hoc arbitration
before sole arbitrators. The remaining seven percent of the agree-
ments studied were either optional or not specific as to the form of
arbitration machinery.
Returning to tripartitism, it is the writer's view that the policy, as
presently administered, is of extreme dubiety. This opinion has been
expressed by others.8 Tripartitism in labor arbitration in its early
nineteenth century origins was something far different from grievance
arbitration under contemporary collective bargaining agreements.
It was frequently invoked under statutes; the parties to the dispute
did not themselves select the partisan representatives; it involved a
considerable degree of mediation; and in most cases where it was
truly arbitration, it consisted of the establishment of contract terms,
not the adjudication of disputes under existing contracts.9
The persistence of tripartitism in present day grievance arbitration
8. COPELOF, MANAGEMENT-UNION ARBITRATION, 28-29 (1948); UPDEGRAFF AND
McCoy, op. cit. supra note 5, at 27; Lesser, Tripartite Boards or Single Arbi-
trators in Voluntary Labor Arbitration?, 5 ARB. J. (n.s.) 276 (1950); Note,
The Use of Tripartite Boards in Labor, Commercial, and International Arbi-
tration, 68 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1954).
9. See WriTE, HIsTORICAL SuRVzY or LABOR ARBITRATioN 3-12 (Labor Rela-
tions Series, U. Pa. Press 1952); Note, supra note 8, at 294-96.
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is probably due, in substantial measure, to the influence of the National
War Labor Board of World War II, itself a tripartite body. It is gener-
ally acknowledged that the Board's policy of recommending the
incorporation of grievance and arbitration procedures in contracts
between parties appearing before it in dispute cases was largely
instrumental in the widespread use of this process during the years
which have ensued. Since modern grievance arbitration thus had its
origins in the recommendations of a governmental agency which was
itself tripartite in character, it was not unnatural for the parties, when
drafting contracts incorporating these recommendations, to tend to
emulate the form of the agency itself and to provide for tripartitism
in their arbitration procedures.
However, the functions, powers and duties of the National War
Labor Board which made tripartitism a desirable feature of that
agency are substantially different from the role played by grievance
arbitration of labor disputes arising under collective bargaining agree-
ments. Furthermore, the method of selecting the representatives of
the parties is materially different. War Labor Board members were
selected and appointed by governmental officials, not by the parties
to the very disputes pending before it. Thus, while the representatives
were partisan in the sense that they represented labor or management,
they were not the direct agents of the parties to the controversies to
be decided. Tripartitism as it has developed in grievance arbitration
contemplates the appointment of partisans who are usually direct
representatives of the parties to the dispute.
In such a setting it is fairly obvious that the parties' representatives
do not, and usually cannot, bring any substantial attitude of objec-
tivity to the arbitration proceedings. In fact, in many cases they are
not even expected to exercise any office other than that of a partisan
advocate, dedicated to the task of seeing to it that their principal wins
the case. Some contracts provide that prior to the selection of the
third or so-called neutral member of the arbitration panel, the two
arbitrators appointed by the parties shall meet and discuss the case
for the purpose of seeking a settlement without the necessity of calling
in the third party outsider. In many instances, the arbitrators ap-
pointed by the parties actually serve as the parties' advocates in the
course of the arbitration hearing, presenting the case for the side
they represent. In such a setting it is, of course, futile to pretend that
there is any element of objectivity injected into the arbitration pro-
ceedings by the presence of representatives of the parties. It is fre-
quently the practice in such cases for the parties to waive any con-
tractual requirements relating to executive sessions of the arbitration
panel and to stipuate that the decision and award of the impartial
member shall constitute the decision and award of the panel and be
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final and binding upon the parties. This may be done even where
the contract expressly provides that a decision of a majority of the
arbitrators is required. To the extent that contractual provisions
relating to tripartitism are regularly and consistently waived, it would
appear that the parties have long since abandoned the concept and
have simply failed to get around to the business of reforming their
contractual procedure. This is unquestionably true in many cases
and is to be explained by the fact that other matters preoccupy their
attention at contract negotiation time.
In some instances, however, even where the party-appointed arbi-
trators serve as advocates presenting the case at the hearing, there is
insistence upon the contractual stipulation that the award must be
made by a majority of the panel. This means that before the decision
and award of the neutral arbitrator shall be binding upon the parties,
he must secure the concurrence of at least one other member of the
panel. Ordinarily this will impose no serious problem, for the neutral
arbitrator will usually sustain the position of one side or the other and
in such cases readily obtains the concurrence of that party's represen-
tative. In the relatively rare case, however, the neutral member of
the panel finds that the true solution to the problem lies somewhere
in between the two positions taken by the parties. If he is required
to obtain the concurrence of at least one other member of the panel
before his decision and award becomes effective, he must, in such a
case, circulate his "tentative" award to the other two parties, seeking
such concurrence. If it develops that neither of the parties' arbitrators
will concur in the tentative award, the neutral member is confronted
with a dilemma. If he persists in the view that his tentative award is
the only position he can conscientiously take in the matter, no award
can be made and the arbitration process will thus be frustrated by
failing to accomplish the end for which it was designed. If, on the
other hand, the neutral member feels that an award must be issued
at any cost, in order that the arbitration process shall fulfill its
function, he must obviously compromise the position he originally
took and side with the views of the partisan arbitrator which, in his
judgment, most closely reflect his own. Most arbitrators feel that they
should not be required to face this dilemma. In a poll conducted
among a selected group of outstanding arbitrators by the American
Arbitration Association in 1946 it was found that only seventeen per-
cent of them preferred tripartite boards whereas seventy-five percent
favored the single arbitrator device. 10
Defenders of tripartitism advance two principal arguments in sup-
port of its continued use. One of these arguments proceeds upon the
thesis that the presence of the parties' representatives on the panel will
10. See Lesser, supra note 8, at 277.
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assist the neutral member in arriving at an informed decision. It is
said that in the course of their discussions, the partisan members may,
by various ways, cast light upon the issues which the neutral member
is unable to obtain in the course of the hearing. There are several
answers to this argument. In the first place, as already indicated,
the parties rarely meet in executive session and consequently this
opportunity for broader enlightenment is not presented. But even in
those cases where such sessions are held (or the views of the partisans
are secured through correspondence), it is the experience of most
neutral arbitrators that they do not benefit from the meetings or cor-
respondence as indicated by the poll cited, above.
However, even if it be conceded that the parties' representatives
may occasionally persuade the neutral member that the position he
has taken in his tentative award is erroneous, the third member is,
by this development, spared the necessity of facing the dilemma men-
tioned, because he is thus convinced that his tentative decision was
incorrect and he does not have to compromise a .position conscien-
tiously taken.
The second argument of the proponents of tripartitism is that it
prevents the neutral member from forcing a decision upon the *parties
which neither of them regards as acceptable. There is admittedly
more force to this contention, and concededly the device of tripartitism
does just this. But, the parties should realize that if they are unwilling
to empower an arbitrator to force an unacceptable award upon them,
they must also expect that on occasion the arbitration process will
prove abortive and fail to produce settlement of cases. They must
assume the risk of no settlement in those instances in which neither
of the parties' arbitrators is willing to concur with the neutral member
and the latter is unwilling to recede from a position which he con-
scientiously believes to be best suited to the case.
The writer is not prepared to say that the parties should abolish
tripartitism. As an arbitrator he would prefer not to be confronted
with the occasional dilemma which the system produces. Any arbitra-
tor is reluctant to participate in a proceeding which fails to produce
its intended result, but no arbitrator should feel compelled to abandon
a position which he has conscientiously taken after -careful study of
all the relevant evidence and argument in a case. The determination
to retain or abandon tripartitism should be made in the light of the
problem it poses as herein discussed, but it should also be made in
view of the parties' basic conception of the role that arbitration is
to play in their total relationship. If they contemplate arbitration as
a'basically judicial process for settling their disputes, tripartitism
seems to interfere with that objective. If, on the other hand, arbitra-
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tion is regarded as an extension of the collective bargaining process,
then the retention and use of tripartitism would seem to be eminently
justified.
CONCLUSION
In this brief review of the problems encountered in the course of
the drafting of the grievance and arbitration provisions of collective
bargaining agreements we have seen that the parties are dealing with
a dynamic subject. Underlying the formalism of language employed
in the drafting of these provisions numerous forces are at work, re-
flecting the experience and philosophies of the parties themselves.
To the extent that experience inspires mutual trust and confidence,
the parties have been willing to make alterations in the form and
substance of their contractual procedures. This has been reflected in
the growing tendency to broaden the definition of the term "griev-
ances," in the employment of informality in the grievance procedure
itself, and finally in the gradual tendency to abandon tripartitism in
the arbitration procedure which results in a relinquishment of party
control over the process. Other observers might be expected to com-
ment upon other aspects of the problem, for it must be conceded that
growth and development in this area has not been restricted to the
matters herein mentioned. The significant fact is that the process is
constantly undergoing change, and may be expected to continue to
change in the future just as it has changed in the recent past.
